RAIPUR: “The DRG men were returning to neighbouring Dantewada district in a Scorpio when the IED blast was triggered near Ambeli-Karkeli villages,” Bastar range IG P Sundarraj said. The impact was such that a chunk of the road hit the windscreen of the following vehicle.
Another IED attack. Another homecoming team blown apart. And the same questions.
Were standard operating procedures (SOPs) followed? How did a 60-70kg IED go undetected? If a road-opening party had sanitised the route, why didn’t they spot the danger lurking in the bushes? A Maoist IED team would have to be somewhere nearby – within sight of the convoy – to manually trigger the explosion just as the vehicle passed over the spot.
These questions are swirling around after the Bijapur blast, just as they did in the aftermath of the IED explosion that killed 10 jawans and their driver in Dantewada in April 2023, and the April 2011 Tekulguda massacre in which 25 security personnel were killed. Even the Dantewada ambush of April 2010, in which 76 policemen were killed, was unleashed on troops returning.
The jawans blown up in Bijapur Monday were battle-weary but jubilant, having neutralised five Maoists in a gruelling 2-day operation. Police say a road opening party had checked the route just prior to the convoy’s arrival on that stretch. The vehicle that was targeted was the seventh in a cavalcade of eight vehicles. The jawans would have felt secure in the knowledge that an ROP had gone the same way. Brig Basant Kumar Ponwar (retd), who spent 18 years in Bastar training security personnel at Jungle Warfare College to “fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla”, says the return journey is the most crucial part of the operation.
“After victory, lethargy takes over. They can’t let down their guard after initial victory in a war zone, or they become the easiest of targets. The most important aspect is to ensure SOPs are followed. To ensure that the ROP has cleared 50-150 yards on both sides of the road in a ‘V’ formation. Did sniffer dogs track the route? A secure corridor has to be given to vehicles and a mobile patrol is supposed to be there on the axis to monitor movement,” the former Army commando said.
As per preliminary probe, the use of light motor vehicles for jawans to return was the first blunder. The second was to assume that Kutru would be a safer route. Apart from this convoy of eight, the other vehicles took other routes through Pamed. Police said two trees, standing on opposite sides of the road, were markers for Maoists for where the IED was buried. Hiding in the trees, a Maoist, posing as a villager, would have triggered the explosion.
The IED attack is a wakeup call for security forces and administration.”Regular patrols, clearing the axis and extensive use of tracker dogs has to be ensured. Mining industries have to be given strict instructions that explosives don’t end up in the wrong hands,” asked Brig Ponwar.
